Abstract
In "The Measure of the Mental" (Davidson 1990), replying to a series of criticisms, that grow out of inadvertence or misunderstanding, Davidson has revisited his thesis concerning the physical and the mental, which he called "anomalous monism" (henceforth, AM). The thesis is subtle and elusive, as it is most often the case with Davidson: there is only one kind of event and state, which has a physical description (i.e., a description in physical terms) and may have a mental description too (i.e., a description in mental terms) -- that shows the monism. But there is no strict law to go from a mental to a physical description of events and states or vice versa -- that shows the anomalousness.This
sophisticated third way captures the intuition, generally shared today, that we are physical machines, whereas it acknowledges the mind a peculiarity: the mental is identical with a part of the physical, but
no part of the mind is specifically identifiable with any part of the physical; or, more weakly, each mental event or state is identical with a physical one, though there is no systematic way to connect
the mental and the physical.