Abstract

In my dissertation I defend a view that I call "pluralistic character-morality." Pluralistic character-morality is the view that: the character of persons plays an essential and irreducible role in determining the overall moral worth of persons; and morally good character, whatever it is, is constituted by a plurality of ontologically independent virtues. The dissertation consists of four chapters, the first two of which serve as a defense of above and the second two of which serve as defense of above. ;The first thesis of pluralistic character-morality is divisible into two distinct theses; these are the irreducibility thesis and the essentiality thesis. In Chapter One, I defend the irreducibility thesis, which is the view that the character of persons is not reducible to talk about the acts or mere dispositions to act of persons. In Chapter Two, I defend the essentiality thesis, which states that the character of persons plays an essential role in determining their overall moral worth. ;The second thesis of pluralistic character-morality is also divisible into two distinct theses; these are the ontological independence thesis and the plurality thesis. The ontological independence thesis states that it is possible to possess one virtue, such as justice, courage, benevolence, etc., without possessing all of them. In Chapter Four, I defend pluralism by showing that none of the most plausible monistic views about morally good character are true