Abstract

This Chapter elucidates and defends the third and final premise of the dissertation's argument. The premise defended here runs thus: Any theory claiming that a certain set of normative requirements ranges over (a) some actions, (b) some states of affairs, (c) some ways of life, or (d) some policies, the actualization of which would advance or set back the interests of persons, analytically depends on some theory claiming that a certain set of normative requirements ranges over (i) all actions, (ii) any states of affairs, (iii) any ways of life, (iv) any policies, or (v) any character traits, the actualization of which would advance or set back the interests of persons. We shall call this premise the Universal-Particular Thesis. The Thesis implies, first, that any theory of the first kind is a logical consequence of a theory of the second kind. It implies, second, that any theory of the first kind has the meanings of its theoretical terms shaped by the theory on which it depends. The Chapter defends this Thesis with an argument of three premises and one lemma. Parts 2-6 explicate the Thesis and defend each premise and the lemma. Part 7 reviews the argument to the Universal-Particular Thesis. Part 8 considers and replies to an objection to the Thesis. The objection is the famous meaning-change argument, due to Paul Feyerabend. It holds that the meanings of terms denoted by the same word differ across different theories. E.g., "mass" in classical mechanics means something different than mass in relativistic mechanics. Part 9 then proves the dissertation's thesis from the chapter Thesis and the theses of the previous Chapters. Part 10 concludes.