Authors
Richard Lauer
St. Lawrence University
Abstract
Recent contributions to the philosophy of social sciences have motivated ontological commitments using appeals to the social sciences. These arguments rely on social scientific realism about the social sciences, the view that our social scientific theories are approximately true. I apply a distinction formulated in metaontology between ontologically loaded and unloaded meanings of existential quantification to argue that there is a pragmatic approach to naturalized social ontology that is minimally realist but that is ontologically austere. I argue that the extant arguments may be construed in terms of this pragmatic approach. The result is an approach to social ontology that is deflationist about naturalized social ontology.
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DOI 10.1007/s10838-021-09581-3
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