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Review of Kevin O'Regan, Alva Noe “Does functionalism really deal with the phenomenal side of experience?” [Book Review]
Abstract
Sensory Motor Contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not give any explanation about why and how objective functional relations should produce phenomenal experience. O’Regan and Noe as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.Links
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Similar books and articles
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References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination.Gerald Edelman & Giulio Tononi - 2000 - Basic Books.
A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
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