Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and COVID-19 irrationalities

Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1037-1061 (2023)
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Abstract

We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinfo...

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2023-04-14

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Christos Kyriacou
University of Cyprus

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Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.

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