From metaphysics and philosophical theses to grammar: Wittgenstein's turn

Philosophical Investigations 28 (2):95–133 (2005)
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Abstract

The paper discusses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as devoid of theses. Although already the _Tractatus aims to abandon philosophical theses, it relapses to such theses. In his later work Wittgenstein develops a novel conception of the status of philosophical statements. Rather than to state what his object of investigation, e.g., the use of a word, must be, the philosopher is to employ rules, examples etc., as 'objects of comparison'. A philosophical statement does not describe a necessity in reality. The modality expressed by the statement is a characteristic of the philosopher's mode of presentation. The aim of Wittgenstein's shift is to avoid dogmatism

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10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00247.x

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Oskari Kuusela
University of East Anglia

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Peter Hacker on forms of representation: A critical evaluation.Hektor K. T. Yan - 2022 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (4):462-479.

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