Identification with Change: Narrative Identity, Enhancements and Transformative Experience

Philosophia 51 (4):2151-2170 (2023)
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Abstract

New medical technologies promise to allow us to transform our core characteristics. Some see these technologies as filled with promise. Others see them as filled with existential risk. David DeGrazia argues that personal identity concerns raised by opponents to enhancement technology fail to impugn attempts by autonomous agents to bring about enhancements with which they autonomously identify. In advancing this argument DeGrazia evaluates five supposedly inviolable core narrative characteristics, concluding that none of these characteristics are in fact inviolable so long as the individual contemplating transformation autonomously identifies with the change they decide to make. Employing insights gleaned from LA Paul’s recent work on the subject of transformative experiences I will argue that at least for some transformations, the prospects for autonomous identification are slim at best. The upshot will be that many of the core narrative traits discussed by DeGrazia will be inviolable in practice, if not in principle.

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Erik Krag
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Citations of this work

Mental Privacy, Cognitive Liberty, and Hog-tying.Parker Crutchfield - forthcoming - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry:1-16.

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References found in this work

Listening to Prozac.Peter D. Kramer - 1994 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 37 (3):460.
Human genetic enhancements: A transhumanist perspective.Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (4):493-506.
Prozac, Enhancement, and Self‐Creation.David Degrazia - 2000 - Hastings Center Report 30 (2):34-40.
Enhancement technologies and human identity.David Degrazia - 2005 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (3):261 – 283.

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