Abstract

In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke famously introduces both the problem of personal identity over time and a controversial solution to it. The problem is to provide a criterion for when a person, A, at a time, t, is the same as a person, B, at a later time, t' . Locke's proposal that A at t is the same person as B at t ' just in case B at t' is conscious of some episode in the mental life of A at t has drawn considerable criticism and given rise to a specialized area of research in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. I argue that many of what have become standard attacks on Locke's theory of personal identity are vitiated because they divorce Locke's discussion of personal identity from the rest of his argument in the Essay. The criticisms attack, in effect, a consequence of Locke's discussion but not the epistemological assumptions that drive it. In particular, many of the criticisms ignore Locke's empiricist critique of the general idea of substance, which is of central importance in understanding how Locke arrives both at the problem of personal identity and his response to it