Abstract

This dissertation is a comprehensive analysis of Locke's account of personal identity. Locke distinguishes "man", referring to bodily identity, from "person", which involves consciousness only. Therefore, sameness of consciousness, extending to past actions and thoughts, makes sameness of self. Locke also stipulates that "person" is "a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents". ;The first step of analysis is an examination of the two essential features of consciousness in respect to personal identity: its reflectiveness, and its dispositional extension to the past by memory. Locke's view on the nature of consciousness strongly foreshadows Kant's, rather than Hume's, as might be expected. Locke argues the self is as real as consciousness, and excludes any consideration of substance. He also defines memory via consciousness. ;This leads to the second step of analysis, an examination of the theoretical foundation of Locke's theory. Otherwise it is open to the charge of triviality, in that persons would simply have whatever memories and, hence, whatever personal identities they happen to have. Locke does not explicitly discuss his underlying theory, but he makes several strongly phenomenalistic points, including his unwavering emphasis on consciousness as sole criterion for persons and personal identity, his focus on the indubitability of some memories, and his remarks on skepticism in his general epistemology. ;The third step of analysis consists of testing Locke's definition of personal identity in various problem cases, the "overextended" consciousness, the "underextended", multiple persons in one body, and exchange of consciousness cases. Locke's definitions consistently provide a sound treatment of these problem cases and survives criticisms from Hume, Reid, Vesey, Leibniz, and Williams. ;The final step of analysis is the forensic application of Locke's theory to problem cases. Locke successfully maintains that consciousness of an action is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of punishment; he also argues that persons must be intelligent agents, having intellectual competence and liberty. Moreover, individuals may legitimately have their freedom curtailed either as punishment, or to protect society if they cannot meet the intelligent agent criterion