Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1):90-114 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories : the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.

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Markus Kohl
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Kant on Method.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Kant. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Why Does Kant Think We Must Believe in the Immortal Soul?Jessica Tizzard - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):114-129.
Kant on Phenomenal Substance.Lorenzo Spagnesi - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-24.
Kant on Modality.Colin Marshall & Aaron Barker - forthcoming - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Kant. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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