European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1238-1252 (2018)

Authors
Reed Winegar
Fordham University
Abstract
Kant claims that an intuitive understanding—such as God would possess—could cognize things in themselves. This claim has prompted many interpreters of Kant's theoretical philosophy to propose that things in themselves correspond to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. In contrast, I argue that Kant's theoretical philosophy does not endorse the common proposal that all things in themselves correspond to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. Instead, Kant's theoretical philosophy maintains that things in themselves might or might not correspond to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. I then consider whether Kant's moral philosophy and theory of reflecting judgment might provide alternative grounds for claiming that we should regard things in themselves as corresponding to how an intuitive understanding would cognize things. I argue that Kant's moral philosophy does not provide such grounds, but his theory of reflecting judgment does. Thus, interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism should attend to the differences between Kant's theoretical philosophy, moral philosophy, and theory of reflecting judgment in assessing the relationship between intuitive understanding and things in themselves.
Keywords Kant  Intuitive Understanding  Intellectual Intuition  Transcendental Idealism  Thing in Itself  Noumena  Noumenon  Supersensible  Intelligible  Noumenal  God
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DOI 10.1111/ejop.12320
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References found in this work BETA

Gesammelte Schriften. Kant - 1912 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 73:105-106.
Problems From Kant.James Van Cleve - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):190-195.
Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves.Markus Kohl - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1):90-114.

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Citations of this work BETA

Kant-Bibliographie 2018.Margit Ruffing - 2020 - Kant-Studien 111 (4):647-702.

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