Abstract

At the heart of MacIntyre's critique of modernity is the problem of moral truth. He argues that the 'Enlightenment project' of justifying morality has failed due to the breakdown of a concep tual scheme inherited from Aristotle, in which the idea of an essen tial human nature or function played a crucial part. Where modernity trades on moral fictions such as 'utility' and 'natural rights', Aris totle's scheme allows moral judgements to be matters of fact. Mac Intyre's denigration of modernity draws attention to his own positive account of moral justification, which I examine from a position of scepticism about moral knowledge. I argue that, while there is much of value in his work - his critique of modern moral philosophy is remarkably cogent and helps clarify what is at stake in discussion of modernity - his account of the good life seems to be circular and his notion of rational progress is unpersuasive. Key Words: Aristotle • ethics • MacIntyre • modernity • truth.