Abstract

There are two related but distinct questions concerning indexical expressions: What is the semantic feature that makes indexical expressions behave differently from non-indexical ones? And what is the special role that indexicals play in performing actions? The goal of my dissertation is to provide an adequate framework in which both questions are addressed. John Perry criticizes Frege claiming that there is no space for the meaning of an indexical expression within the Fregean semantics. In Chapter 1, however, I argue that Frege's scattered remarks on indexical expressions, despite prima facie inconsistency, have at least a plausible and promising interpretation. In Chapter 2, I turn to Perry's theories. I agree with Perry that both of the above two questions should be dealt with within one framework but disagree with him on the nature of the framework. Crudely speaking, Perry, at least in his early theories, takes the semantic feature of indexical expressions to be responsible for their special cognitive significance in performing actions. I show that this idea faces many problems. In Chapter 3 through 5, I develop the clues and lessons from Chapter 1 and 2. As for the semantic aspect of indexicality, I argue that the semantic job of indexical expressions is pointing, in order to produce effective content . In Chapter 4, I consider the action-theoretic aspect of indexicality. After examining various cases I argue that there are no essentially indexical thoughts that are responsible for performing actions. The explanation of whether one performs an action or fails to perform it lies fundamentally not in the existence of essentially indexical thoughts but in the availability of proper beliefs and the agent's success or failure in connecting those beliefs. In Chapter 5, I seek the grounds that make plausible the claim that indexicality is a pervasive phenomenon, not restricted only to expressions such as "I", "you", "now", etc