Trust in the Guise of Belief

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):156-172 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non-doxastic state. This has even lead some philosophers to think that trust is a unique mental state that has both mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit, or to give up on the idea that there is a univocal analysis of trust to be had. Here, I propose that ‘trust’ is the name we give to mental states that we would think of as beliefs if belief was to be thought of in ‘pragmatist’ terms and belief resists ‘pragmatist’ treatment. Only such an account, I argue, can univocally account for all the diverse features of trust. As such, I also propose that the explanation of trust provides us with a case for understanding the limitations of a comprehensively ‘pragmatist’, or ‘Neo-Wittgensteinian’ conception of the mental.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,346

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Govier on Trust.Robert C. Pinto - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (2):263-291.
Deciding to trust, coming to believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459.
The Nature of Epistemic Trust.Benjamin W. McCraw - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (4):413-430.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-03-22

Downloads
53 (#224,066)

6 months
2 (#299,341)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anthony Booth
University of Sussex

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations