Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen

Erkenntnis 79 (3):729-732 (2013)
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Abstract

In a recent exchange, Vaesen and Kelp have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.

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Christoph Kelp
University of Glasgow

References found in this work

A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press. pp. 111-134.
A Virtue Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):427-440.

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