Have Compatibilists Solved the Luck Problem for Libertarians?

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Philosophical Inquiries 2 (2):9-36 (2014)
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Abstract

A pair of compatibilists, John Fischer (2012: ch. 6; n.d.) and Manuel Vargas (2012) have responded to a problem about luck that Alfred Mele (2005, 2006) posed for incompatibilist believers in free will and moral responsibility. They offer assistance to libertarians - at least on this front. In this paper, we assess their responses and explain why what they offer is inadequate for libertarian purposes.

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Stephen Kearns
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Direct control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.

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References found in this work

Free Will, Praise and Blame.J. J. C. Smart - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Moral responsibility and the continuation problem.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.
Why the luck problem isn't.Manuel Vargas - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):419-436.

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