Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck

Theoria 73 (2):173-178 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is argued that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. It is further claimed that once one offers a more developed notion of luck and disambiguates the problem of moral luck from the problem of epistemic luck (especially in its sceptical guise), neither of these papers is able to offer unambiguous grounds for thinking that there is a problem of moral luck. Indeed, it is shown that insofar as these papers succeed in making a prima facie case for the existence of epistemic luck, it is only the familiar sceptical variant of this problem that they identify.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,718

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise.John Greco - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366.
Moral and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.
Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
Moral Luck and the Professions.Jeffrey Whitman - 2008 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 27 (1-4):35-54.
Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
Epistemic luck and the generality problem.Kelly Becker - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
203 (#88,490)

6 months
5 (#243,322)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.
The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
Epistemic luck and the generality problem.Kelly Becker - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
Aesthetic risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Think 17 (48):11-24.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 30 references / Add more references