- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck
The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21 (2015)
Abstract
The “problem of present luck” targets a standard libertarian thesis about free will. It has been argued that there is an analogous problem about luck for compatibilists. This article explores similarities and differences between the alleged problemsAuthor's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
The case for hyper-libertarianism.Gerald Harrison - 2006 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):1-6.
Libertarianism, luck, and control.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.
Lucky agents, big and little: should size really matter?David Blumenfeld - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):311-319.
Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom?E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.
Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
The luck argument against event-causal libertarianism: It is here to stay.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.
On Alfred Mele's free will and luck.Derk Pereboom - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.
How (not) to attack the luck argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.
Analytics
Added to PP
2015-01-08
Downloads
69 (#224,674)
6 months
10 (#187,567)
2015-01-08
Downloads
69 (#224,674)
6 months
10 (#187,567)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):262-277.
Grounding and the luck objection to agent-causal libertarianism.Joel Archer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1763-1775.
Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention.Robyn Repko Waller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5175-5203.
Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Chance.Penelope Mackie - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:265-287.
References found in this work
Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6d9b7f7c4c-67rzb uwo