Ronald Dworkin on abortion and assisted suicide

The Journal of Ethics 5 (3):221-240 (2001)
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In the first part of this article, I raisequestions about Dworkin''s theory of theintrinsic value of life and about the adequacyof his proposal to understand abortion in termsof different ways of valuing life. In thesecond part of the article, I consider hisargument in ``The Philosophers'' Brief on AssistedSuicide'''', which claims that the distinctionbetween killing and letting die is morallyirrelevant, the distinction between intendingand foreseeing death can be morally relevantbut is not always so. I argue that thekilling/letting die distinction can be relevantin the context of assisted suicide, but alsoshow when it is not. Then I consider why theintention/foresight distinction can be morallyirrelevant and conclude by presenting analternative argument for physician-assistedsuicide.



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Frances Myrna Kamm
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

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Climate Matters for Future People.Paul Bou-Habib - 2016 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 40 (1):143-157.
The Dialectic of Autonomy and Beneficence in the Standard Argument for ‘Death with Dignity'.Bell Jeremy Raymond - 2016 - Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics 6 (1):Article 3.

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Euthanasia.Philippa Foot - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2):85-112.

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