A Kantian take on fallible principles and fallible judgments

American Dialectic 4 (1):1-27 (2014)
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According to Kant, if an agent acts according to his/her conscience, then s/he has done all that s/he ought as far as morality is concerned. But Kant thinks that agents can be mistaken in their subjective determinations of their duties. That is, Kant thinks it is possible for an agent to believe that some action X is right even though it is an objective truth that X is not right; according to Kant, agents do not have infallible knowledge of right and wrong. In this paper, I explore this doctrine in order to determine whether it is defensible. In particular, I confront the blameworthiness of acting contrary to fallible knowledge and the blamelessness of acting according to fallible judgment.



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Samuel J. M. Kahn
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis

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References found in this work

Moral Worth.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):223.
I_— _Ronald de Sousa.Ronald de Sousa & Adam Morton - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):247-263.
Huckleberry Finn and moral motivation.Alan Goldman - 2010 - Philosophy and Literature 34 (1):pp. 1-16.

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