Conflicting Rules and Paradox

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):410-433 (2014)
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Abstract

First paragraph: This paper seeks to understand various paradoxes as cases of conflicting rules. In particular, the ambition is to outline a new perspective on and response to the Liar -- though it will take us a while to get that far. We begin in Section 1 with an account of simple rule confliction. Section 2 then brings this account to bear on a paradox, the Secretary Liberation Paradox, which is readily seen to involve conflicting rules. Finally in Section 3 I suggest that the Liar can also be seen as a case of rule confliction, and outline briefly how that perspective provides for Liar arguments to be blocked

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Colin Johnston
University of Stirling

Citations of this work

Replacing Truth?Matti Eklund - 2014 - In Brett Sherman & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Metasemantics.

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References found in this work

In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Logic, semantics, metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by John Corcoran & J. H. Woodger.
Replacing truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
Truth.Alexis G. Burgess & John P. Burgess - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
Inconsistent Languages.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.

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