Abstract
In this paper I shall defend a projectivist view of sensory experience. The case I shall focus on is that of color experience. Projectivism has recently been criticized by some authors who claim that it is unintelligible, or at least implausible, and that it makes a severe category mistake. I shall argue that despite some prima facie impressions of implausibility, projectivism can be made intelligible, and plausible, if its details are spelled out in a reasonable way. In addition, projectivism is ubiquitous in human psychology, and certain cases of projection are reasonably viewed as making a category mistake. Viewed from this perspective, sensory projection is just one instance of projectivism, brought about by low-level perceptual processing. Whether sensory projection is one that makes a category mistake is not obvious. However, even if it does, this is perfectly compatible with the evolutionary advantage of sensation and perception