Non-cogntivism, normativity, belief

Ratio 12 (4):420–435 (1999)
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Abstract

I argue that the (widely accepted) normative constraints on belief raise a serious problem for non-cognitivism about normativity

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Citations of this work

Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
Why I’m still a proportionalist.Travis N. Rieder - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):251-270.
Reasons and Entailment.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):353-374.

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