How Berkeley corrupted his capacity to conceive
Philosophia 37 (3):415-429 (2008)
Abstract
Berkeley’s capacity to conceive of mind-independent bodies was corrupted by his theory of representation. He thought that representation of things outside the mind depended on resemblance. Since ideas can resemble nothing than ideas, and all ideas are mind dependent, he concluded that we couldn’t form ideas of mind-independent bodies. More generally, he thought that we had no inner resembling proxies for mind-independent bodies, and so we couldn’t even form a notion of such things. Because conception is a suggestible faculty, Berkeley’s arguments actually made it the case that he himself couldn’t conceive of mind-independent bodies.Author's Profile
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2009
DOI
10.1007/s11406-008-9158-0
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Citations of this work
Why Can An Idea Be Like Nothing But Another Idea? A Conceptual Interpretation of Berkeley's Likeness Principle.Peter West - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (First View):1-19.
Margaret Cavendish on conceivability, possibility, and the case of colours.Peter West - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (3):456-476.
Resemblance, Representation and Scepticism: The Metaphysical Role of Berkeley’s Likeness Principle.David Bartha - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1):1.
Comments on Michael Jacovides “how Berkeley corrupted his capacity to conceive”.Jennifer Smalligan Marusic - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):431-436.
Two hostile Bishops? A Reexamination of the Relationship between Peter Browne and George Berkeley beyond their alleged Controversy.Fasko Manuel - 2022 - Intellectual History Review 2022:1-21.
