Abstract

Traditionally it is taken for granted that mental imagery (MI) is a mental representation (MR) of some kind or format. This yields that theory of MR can give an adequate and exhaustive explanation of MI. Such co-relation between the two is usually seen as unproblematic. But is it really so? This article aims at challenging the theoretical claim that the dominant ‘two-world’ account of MR can adequately explain MI. Contrary to the standard theory of MR, there are reasons to believe that: (a) MI has different cognitive architecture, (b) the relations between elements of MI are dynamic, (c) relations between elements of MI are context-dependent. Consequently, it follows that dominant account of MR neglects important characteristics of MI and, thus, fails to give a comprehensive explanation of the latter. Alternatively, I will argue that a sign-theoretic approach, proposed by C. S. Peirce, can suggest a promising explanation of MI and fully account for the divergent empirical data on the matter.