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Who needs intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques
In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 232-256 (2014)
Abstract
A number of philosophers have recently suggested that the role of intuitions in the epistemology of armchair philosophy has been exaggerated. This suggestion is rehearsed and endorsed. What bearing does the rejection of the centrality of intuition in armchair philosophy have on experimentalist critiques of the latter? I distinguish two very different kinds of experimentalist critique: one critique requires the centrality of intuition; the other does not.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):95-116.
Reflective Equilibrium.Yuri Cath - 2016 - In Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 213-230.
Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
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