The Folk Probably do Think What you Think They Think

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):421-441 (2013)
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Abstract

Much of experimental philosophy consists of surveying 'folk' intuitions about philosophically relevant issues. Are the results of these surveys evidence that the relevant folk intuitions cannot be predicted from the ‘armchair’? We found that a solid majority of philosophers could predict even results claimed to be 'surprising'. But, we argue, this does not mean that such experiments have no role at all in philosophy.

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2012-10-19

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Author Profiles

David Manley
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Billy Dunaway
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Anna Edmonds
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

References found in this work

Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.
The rise and fall of experimental philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.

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