The Implausibility/Triviality Dilemma of Standpoint Epistemology

Abstract

Within the literature of Standpoint Epistemology, there is a pervasive tendency to neglect to discuss whether a dominantly situated knower can achieve a standpoint of a social group they are not a part of. Emily Tilton argues that socially dominant individuals do not face strong, substantive limits on what they can know. If Emily Tilton is correct, the theses of Standpoint Epistemology that entail otherwise are implausible. The remaining theses within Standpoint Epistemology are applications of trivially true theses to issues of social location and social marginalization. However, even though the plausible theses of Standpoint Epistemology are trivially true, the field itself is not. Standpoint epistemologists who neglect to discuss the controversial theses within the field often present arguments which do not require the truth of implausible theses. Despite being made of trivially true theses, Standpoint Epistemology is still responsible for interesting, important contributions.

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