What Fa says about a

Dialectica 54 (1):3-28 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A sentence mentioning an object can be regarded as saying any one of several things about that object, without there by being ambiguous. Some of the repercussions of this commonplace observation are recorded, and some critical discussion is provided of views which would appear to go against it.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What fa says about a.Lloyd Humberstone - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (1):3–28.
Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge.Jonas Olson - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365-378.
Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1.
Lambert, mally, and the principle of independence.Edward N. Zalta - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1):447-459.
Classical Theories of Reference.Charles Travis - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (sup1):139-159.
Classical Theories of Reference.Charles Travis - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 6:139-159.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-22

Downloads
20 (#793,209)

6 months
4 (#862,833)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lloyd Humberstone
Monash University

Citations of this work

The proper treatment of variables in predicate logic.Kai F. Wehmeier - 2018 - Linguistics and Philosophy 41 (2):209-249.
Replacement in Logic.Lloyd Humberstone - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):49-89.
Can every modifier be treated as a sentence modifier?Lloyd Humberstone - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):241-275.
Geach’s Categorial Grammar.Lloyd Humberstone - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):281 - 317.
Abstraction in Fitch's Basic Logic.Eric Thomas Updike - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):215-243.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Fact, Fiction and Forecast.Edward H. Madden - 1955 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (2):271-273.
Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
Reference and Generality.Peter Geach - 1962 - Studia Logica 15:301-303.
Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude.David Miller - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):166-177.
Statements partly about observation.David Lewis - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (1):1-31.

View all 22 references / Add more references