The liar paradox, expressibility, possible languages

In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (L) is false. But since this is just what (L) says, (L) is then true. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if things are as a given sentence says they are, the sentence is true.) So (L) is true. So (L) is both true and false. Contradiction.

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Matti Eklund
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):597-645.
Model-Theoretic Semantics and Revenge Paradoxes.Lorenzo Rossi - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):1035-1054.
Consistent Inconsistency Theories.Bradley Armour‐Garb - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):639 – 654.
More on 'A Liar Paradox'.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.

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