Abstract

The main objective of this book is to provide an ontological account for the category ‘religion’ that is disputed in some social constructionist works and justify its significance for religious freedom. The primary source of this study is the literature from constructionist theory of religion and the new critics of religious freedom. This study utilizes Sally Haslanger’s framework on realist social constructionism to argue that social constructions do not necessarily imply eliminativism. Hence, this thesis argues that: 1) religion exists and is real as a distinctive social category though it is socially constructed because it has a distinctive causal power in society. The existence of religion is observer-dependent but epistemically objective since it is part of collective intentionality shared by certain groups of people. 2) The ontological status of religion is significant to justify religious freedom to combat discrimination and coercion based on religion and belief. Thus, the absence of the category ‘religion’ would delegitimize any social and political justice advocacy for protecting religious minorities.