Results for 'epiphenomenalism'

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  1. Epiphenomenalism - the Do's and the Don 'Ts'.Lawrence A. Shapiro & Elliott Sober - 2007 - In G. Wolters & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Thinking About Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern physics. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 235-264.
    When philosophers defend epiphenomenalist doctrines, they often do so by way of a priori arguments. Here we suggest an empirical approach that is modeled on August Weismann’s experimental arguments against the inheritance of acquired characters. This conception of how epiphenomenalism ought to be developed helps clarify some mistakes in two recent epiphenomenalist positions – Jaegwon Kim’s (1993) arguments against mental causation, and the arguments developed by Walsh (2000), Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002), and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that natural (...)
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  2. Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will.Sven Walter - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, (...)
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  3. Epiphenomenalism.William Robinson - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work (...)
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  4. Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.
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  5.  21
    Replacing Epiphenomenalism: A Pluralistic Enactive Take on the Metaplasticity of Early Body Ornamentation.Duilio Garofoli & Antonis Iliopoulos - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (2):215-242.
    In the domain of evolutionary cognitive archaeology, the early body ornaments from the Middle Stone Age/Palaeolithic are generally treated as mere by-products of an evolved brain-bound cognitive architecture selected to cope with looming social problems. Such adaptive artefacts are therefore taken to have been but passive means of broadcasting a priori envisaged meanings, essentially playing a neutral role for the human mind. In contrast to this epiphenomenalist view of material culture, postphenomenology and the Material Engagement Theory have been making a (...)
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  6. Epiphenomenalism, Laws, and Properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
  7. Epiphenomenalism.Sven Walter - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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  8. Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.Neil Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
    I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize (...)
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  9. Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism.Brie Gertler - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 62-86.
    Some physicalists (Balog 2012, Howell 2013), and most dualists, endorse the acquaintance response to the Knowledge Argument. This is the claim that Mary gains substantial new knowledge, upon leaving the room, because phenomenal knowledge requires direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties. The acquaintance response is an especially promising way to make sense of the Mary case. I argue that it casts doubt on two claims often made on behalf of physicalism, regarding parsimony and mental causation. I show that those who endorse (...)
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  10.  55
    Could Anyone Justifiably Believe Epiphenomenalism?Richard Swinburne - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):196--216.
    Epiphenomenalism claims that all conscious events are caused immediately by brain events, and no conscious events cause brain events. In order to have a justified belief in a theory someone needs a justified belief that it or some higher-level theory predicts certain events and those events occurred. To have either of the latter beliefs we depend ultimately on the evidence of apparent experience, memory, and testimony, which is credible in the absence of defeaters; it is an undermining defeater to (...)
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  11. Epiphenomenalism Explained.Norman Bacrac - 2010 - Philosophy Now 81:10-13.
    Epiphenomenalism expressed as a form of materialism in two key axioms; distinguished from Cartesian dualism, physicalism, eliminativism; shown to be compatible with a subjective experience of free choice but not with libertarian free will - the social consequences of this view.
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  12. Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument From Consciousness.Daniel Lim - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):439 - 450.
    In his so-called argument from consciousness (AC), J. P. Moreland argues that the phenomenon of consciousness furnishes us with evidence for the existence of God. In defending AC, however, Moreland makes claims that generate an undesirable tension. This tension can be posed as a dilemma based on the contingency of the correlation between mental and physical states. The correlation of mental and physical states is either contingent or necessary. If the correlation is contingent then epiphenomenalism is true. If the (...)
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  13. Consciousness, Adaptation, and Epiphenomenalism.Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger - 1998 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
    Consciousness and evolution are complex phenomena. It is sometimes thought that if adaptation explanations for some varieties of consciousness, say, conscious visual perception, can be had, then we may be reassured that at least those kinds of consciousness are not epiphenomena. But what if other varieties of consciousness, for example, dreams, are not adaptations? We sort out the connections among evolution, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism in order to show that the consequences for the nature and causal efficacy of consciousness are (...)
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  14. The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism.Yujin Nagasawa - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.
    Frank Jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism. One of the most interesting criticisms of Jackson's position is what I call the 'inconsistency objection'. The inconsistency objection says that Jackson's position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument. The inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently, including Michael Watkins, Fredrik Stjernberg, and Neil Campbell. Surprisingly enough, while Jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency objection is 'the most powerful reply to (...)
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  15. Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
    The University of Guelph, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, CANADA.
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  16.  91
    Evidence Against Epiphenomenalism.Ned Block - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
  17. Evolution, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism.Alvin Plantinga - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):602-619.
    A common contemporary claim is the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism—the idea, roughly, that there is no such person as God or anything at all like God—with the view that our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the processes to which contemporary evolutionary theory direct our attention. Call this view ‘N&E’. I’ve argued elsewhere that this view is incoherent or self-defeating in that anyone who accepts it has a defeater for R, the proposition that her cognitive faculties are (...)
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  18. Epiphenomenalism.Keith Campbell & Nicholas J. J. Smith - 1993 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning — rather, (...)
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  19.  6
    Epiphenomenalism, Laws & Properties.Denis Robinson - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
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  20.  67
    Epiphenomenalism as a Solution to the Ontological Mind-Body Problem.Dieter Birnbacher - 1988 - Ratio 1 (1):17-32.
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  21. Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism.William S. Robinson - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):100-117.
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level (...)
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  22.  91
    Methodological Epiphenomenalism.Alec Hyslop - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):61-70.
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  23.  29
    Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction.Marc Slors - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):15-36.
    In the first part of this paper I argue that epiphenomenalism does not pose a threat to nonreductive physicalism, if type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy of mental (or in general higher-level) typing of events and/or states. Furthermore, if justifiable induction over folk-psychological regularities is possible independently of the ways in which these regularities are realized, type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy ofmental typing. Inthe second part of this paper I explain how justifiable 'cross-realization induction' can be (...)
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  24.  58
    Epiphenomenalism and Occasionalism: Problems of Mental Causation, Old and New.Sarah Patterson - 2005 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (3):239-257.
  25.  99
    Epiphenomenalism and Content.Mark Eli Kalderon - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (1):71-90.
  26. In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism.Volker Gadenne - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
    Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.
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  27. Trying Out Epiphenomenalism.Peter Bieri - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (3):283-309.
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  28. Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.
  29. Epiphenomenalism and Machines: A Discussion of Van Rooijen's Critique of Popper.Davor Pećnjak - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):404-408.
  30. McGinn's Materialism and Epiphenomenalism.F. W. Dauer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):136-139.
    Colin McGinn urged that while a brain state P explains consciousness, a conception P is cognitively inaccessible to us. This paper argues that McGinn's argument for his form of materialism is committed to P being epiphenomenal or causally inert relative to such things as the movements of our bodies. As a result, McGinn's materialism creates a duality in the brain and thereby faces the same problem of epiphenomenalism which plagues the Cartesian dualist.
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  31. Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism: A Reply to Honderich.Peter Smith - 1984 - Analysis 44 (2):83-86.
  32. In Defense of Epiphenomenalism.Jack C. Lyons - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.
    Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive materialism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive materialism does not have epiphenomenalist implications but because the epiphenomenalist implications are actually virtues of the theory, rather than vices. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible.
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  33. Epiphenomenalism and the Eliminative Strategy.Jason A. Beyer - 1999 - Kinesis 26 (1):18-36.
     
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  34. Epiphenomenalism: Dead End or Way Out?Michael Pauen, Alexander Staudacher & Sven Walter - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.
     
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  35.  48
    Interrogating the Epiphenomenalist Tradition.Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani - 2016 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 33 (3):481-501.
    Epiphenomenalism has had a long historical tradition. It is the view that mental properties are causally inert with respect to the physical world. In this paper, I argue that this tradition faces enormous challenges and needs better arguments to defend its position, and to demonstrate this, I interrogate the strands including computationalism, the idea of the illusion of conscious will, and causal exclusionism.
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  36. Radical Epiphenomenalism: B.F. Skinner's Account of Private Events.Richard E. Creel - 1980 - Behaviorism 8 (1):31-53.
     
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  37. An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism.Jason Megill - 2013 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):5 - 17.
    I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily. I address possible objections and then conclude by considering some implications the argument has for dualism.
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  38. Evolution and Epiphenomenalism.William Robinson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):27-42.
    This paper addresses the question whether evolutionary principles are compatible with epiphenomenalism, and argues for an affirmative answer. A general summary of epiphenomenalism is provided, along with certain specifications relevant to the issues of this paper. The central argument against compatibility is stated and rebutted. A specially powerful version of the argument, due to William James (1890), is stated. The apparent power of this argument is explained as resulting from a problem about our understanding of pleasure and an (...)
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  39. Epistemological Challenges to Qualia-Epiphenomenalism.Alexander Staudacher - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):153-175.
    One of the strongest objections to epiphenomenalism is that it precludes any kind of knowledge of qualia, since empirical knowledge has to include a causal relationship between the respective belief and the object of knowledge. It is argued that this objection works only if the causal relationship is understood in a very specific sense (as a 'direct' causal relationship). Epiphenomenalism can, however, live well with other kinds of causal relationships ('indirect' causal relationships) or even with a reliability account (...)
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  40. Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will.Shaun Gallagher - 2006 - In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. pp. 109-124.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
     
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  41.  5
    Evolution, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism.Alvin Plantinga - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):602-619.
    A common contemporary claim is the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism—the idea, roughly, that there is no such person as God or anything at all like God—with the view that our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the processes to which contemporary evolutionary theory direct our attention. Call this view ‘N&E’. I’ve argued elsewhere that this view is incoherent or self-defeating in that anyone who accepts it has a defeater for R, the proposition that her cognitive faculties are (...)
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  42. Epiphenomenalism and Agency.David Hommen - 2018 - Mind and Matter 16 (1):17–41.
    A prominent objection against epiphenomenalism—the doctrine that mental phenomena are causally inefficacious—is that it is incompatible with the phenomenon of human agency. It is essential for our being agents, so the argument goes, that our mental states contribute to the causation of our actions. In this paper, I wish to refute that objection and argue that epiphenomenalism, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, is fully compatible with human agency.
     
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  43.  44
    Epiphenomenalism and Causal Asymmetry.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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    An Exclusion Problem for Epiphenomenalist Dualism.Bradford Saad - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):247-256.
    The chief motivation for epiphenomenalist dualism is its promise to solve dualism’s causal exclusion problem without inducing causal overdetermination or violations of the causal closure of the physical. This paper argues that epiphenomenalist dualism is itself susceptible to an exclusion problem. The problem exploits symmetries of determination and influence generated by a wide class of physical theories. Further, I argue that there is an interference effect between solving epiphenomenalist dualism's exclusion problem and using epiphenomenalist dualism as a solution to the (...)
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  45.  66
    Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    This paper provides articulates a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian kind of free will—a kind of free will that’s incompatible with both determinism and epiphenomenalism—and responds to scientific arguments against the existence of this sort of freedom. In other words, the paper argues that we don’t have any good empirical scientific reason to believe that human beings don’t possess a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian sort of free will.
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    Generalized Epiphenomenalism.William E. Seager - manuscript
    I want to show that a common and plausible interpretation of what science tells us about the fundamental structure of the world – the ‘scientific picture of the world’ or SPW for short – leads to what I’ll call ‘generalized epiphenomenalism’, which is the view that the only features of the world that possess causal efficacy are fundamental physical features. I think that generalized epiphenomenalism follows pretty straightforwardly from the SPW as I’ll present it, but it might seem (...)
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  47. More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism.Hans Muller - 2008 - Philosophia 37 (1):109-112.
    I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously (...)
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  48.  23
    Epiphenomenalism and Metaethical Non-Naturalism.Paul T. Menzel - 1970 - Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1):43-55.
  49.  67
    Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism.Danilo Suster - 2001 - Acta Analytica 16 (26):23-43.
    Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism -/- Mental properties are said to be epiphenomenal because they do not pass the counterfactual test of causal relevance. Jacob (1996) adopts the defence of causal efficacy of mental properties developed by LePore and Loewer (1987). They claim that those who argue for the epiphenomenalism of the mental place too strong a requirement on causal relevance, which excludes causally efficacious properties. Given a proper analysis of causal relevance, the causal efficacy of mental properties is saved. (...)
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    Methodological Epiphenomenalism.Alec Hyslop - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):61-70.
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