Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243 (2020)
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This paper is about how epistemic and practical reasons for belief can be compared against one another when they conflict. It provides a model for determining what one ought to believe, all-things-considered, when there are conflicting epistemic and practical reasons. The model is meant to supplement a form of pluralism about doxastic normativity that I call ‘Inclusivism’. According to Inclusivism, both epistemic and practical considerations can provide genuine normative reasons for belief, and both types of consideration can contribute to metaphysically determining what beliefs one ought, all-things-considered, to have.
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DOI | 10.1007/s11098-019-01307-y |
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References found in this work BETA
The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation.Stephen P. Stich - 1990 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Doxastic Divergence and the Problem of Comparability. Pragmatism Defended Further.Anne Meylan - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):199-216.
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