Authors
Colin Howson
Last affiliation: London School of Economics
Abstract
This paper examines the famous doctrine that independent prediction garners more support than accommodation. The standard arguments for the doctrine are found to be invalid, and a more realistic position is put forward, that whether evidence supports or not a hypothesis depends on the prior probability of the hypothesis, and is independent of whether it was proposed before or after the evidence. This position is implicit in the subjective Bayesian theory of confirmation, and the paper ends with a brief account of this theory, and answer to the principal objections to it.
Keywords Bayesianism   Prediction and Accommodation   Confirmation   Philosophy of Science
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Citations of this work BETA

Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635.
The 'Old Evidence' Problem.Colin Howson - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):547-555.
Accomodation, Prediction, and Confirmation.Lee McIntyre - 2001 - Perspectives on Science 9 (3):308-323.

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