Philosophy of Science 58 (4):574-585 (1991)

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Abstract
Maher (1988, 1990) has recently argued that the way a hypothesis is generated can affect its confirmation by the available evidence, and that Bayesian confirmation theory can explain this. In particular, he argues that evidence known at the time a theory was proposed does not confirm the theory as much as it would had that evidence been discovered after the theory was proposed. We examine Maher's arguments for this "predictivist" position and conclude that they do not, in fact, support his view. We also cast doubt on the assumptions of Maher's alleged Bayesian proofs
Keywords Bayesianism   Prediction and Accommodation   Philosophy of Science   Confirmation
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DOI 10.1086/289641
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Versus Historical Theories of Confirmation.Alan Musgrave - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):1-23.
A Bayesian Analysis of Excess Content and the Localisation of Support.Colin Howson & Allan Franklin - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):425-431.
Newton and Kepler, a Bayesian Approach.Allan Franklin - 1984 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (4):379.

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Citations of this work BETA

Predictivism and Old Evidence: A Critical Look at Climate Model Tuning.Mathias Frisch - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):171-190.
Prediction and Accommodation Revisited.John Worrall - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):54-61.
The 'Old Evidence' Problem.Colin Howson - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):547-555.
Prediction and Accommodation Revisited.John Worrall - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):54-61.

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