Reasoning with dimensions and magnitudes

Artificial Intelligence and Law 27 (3):309-345 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper shows how two models of precedential constraint can be broadened to include legal information represented through dimensions. I begin by describing a standard representation of legal cases based on boolean factors alone, and then reviewing two models of constraint developed within this standard setting. The first is the “result model”, supporting only a fortiori reasoning. The second is the “reason model”, supporting a richer notion of constraint, since it allows the reasons behind a court’s decisions to be taken into account. I then show how the initial representation can be modified to incorporate dimensional information and how the result and reason models can be adapted to this new dimensional setting. As it turns out, these two models of constraint, which are distinct in the standard setting, coincide once they are transposed to the new dimensional setting, yielding exactly the same patterns of constraint. I therefore explore two ways of refining the reason model of constraint so that, even in the dimensional setting, it can still be separated from the result model.

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John Horty
University of Maryland, College Park

References found in this work

Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):305-309.
The Authority of Law.Alan R. White & J. Raz - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120):278.
Reasoning with dimensions and magnitudes.John Horty - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 27 (3):309-345.

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