Using argument schemes for hypothetical reasoning in law

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Artificial Intelligence and Law 18 (2):153-174 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper studies the use of hypothetical and value-based reasoning in US Supreme-Court cases concerning the United States Fourth Amendment. Drawing upon formal AI & Law models of legal argument a semi-formal reconstruction is given of parts of the Carney case, which has been studied previously in AI & law research on case-based reasoning. As part of the reconstruction, a semi-formal proposal is made for extending the formal AI & Law models with forms of metalevel reasoning in several argument schemes. The result is compared with Rissland’s (1989) analysis in terms of dimensions and Ashley’s (2008) analysis in terms of his process model of legal argument with hypotheticals

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10.1007/s10506-010-9094-8

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Citations of this work

Argumentation schemes in AI and Law.Katie Atkinson & Trevor Bench-Capon - 2021 - Argument and Computation 12 (3):417-434.
HYPO's legacy: introduction to the virtual special issue.T. J. M. Bench-Capon - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (2):205-250.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
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Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.

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