Philosophy Compass 16 (3):1-12 (2021)

Authors
Joe Horton
University College London
Abstract
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer ‘yes’ and ‘no’, respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. These views contrast with fully aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is ‘yes’, and with non-aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is ‘no’. In this paper, I review the most natural and influential ways of developing partially aggregative views and explain the main problems they face.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phc3.12719
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,916
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Equality and Priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
Good and Evil.Peter Geach - 1956 - Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.

View all 47 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Can We Measure the Badness of Death for the Person Who Dies?Thomas Schramme - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 90:253-276.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-02-17

Total views
95 ( #121,249 of 2,497,781 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #40,525 of 2,497,781 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes