Annals of Science 33 (5):476-480 (1976)

Wall is convincing on the Fuller court, but less so on Holmes, who may have understood Spencer's Social statics as a laissez faire rather than as a Darwinist document. Sharlin helps us to follow Spencer's attempt to universalize the concept of energy, even if Sharlin's explanation for Spencer's failure reduces to an application of the classical insight that physical phenomena are more predictable than social phenomena. Sharlin's conception of ‘scientism’ is helpful in some contexts, but less so in others; we need to remind ourselves that the role of values in scientism is active as well as passive
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DOI 10.1080/00033797600200661
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The Pursuit of Certainty.Shirley Robin Letwin - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):337-339.

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Reply to Comments.David Wiggins - 1976 - In J. P. Cleave & Stephan Körner (eds.), Philosophy of Logic: Papers and Discussions. University of California Press. pp. 159.
Herbert Spencer and Scientism.Harold Issadore Sharlin - 1976 - Annals of Science 33 (5):457-465.


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