Of brains and planets: on a causal criterion for mind-brain identities

Synthese 193 (4):1177-1189 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to empirically establish local identities between mental and neural properties. If successful, such an account would settle the debate on the mind-body problem. In this paper, I argue that Glymour’s approach falls short of its aims. The causal criterion which he proposes does not provide a sufficient condition for the local identification of properties. Moreover, his account does not succeed in rendering local mind-brain identities empirically testable. Therefore, the mind-body problem cannot be solved as easily as Glymour assumes

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review.David Pineda & Agustín Vicente - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):97-120.
Mental Causation: Realization and Reduction.Chang-Seong Hong - 2000 - Dissertation, Brown University
Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):261-273.
Deconstructing new wave materialism.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 307--318.
Powers and the mind–body problem.István Aranyosi - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):57 – 72.
Mental Representation and Causal Explanation.Jean Rahel Kazez - 1990 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-06

Downloads
113 (#190,850)

6 months
7 (#740,041)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Vera Hoffmann-Kolss
University of Bern

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephen Mumford.
Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.

View all 29 references / Add more references