Deconstructing new wave materialism

In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 307--318 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that water = H2O. We identify the kinds and substances involved in theoretical identities by certain of their contingent properties. What we discover when we discover a theoretical identity is the underlying nature of the kind that we identify by those contingent properties. Now, of course, it was being a posteriori, not being contingent, that mattered to the identity theorists anyway, so the necessity of identity is not, in itself, damaging to mind brain identity theories. However, Kripke also argued persuasively that the alleged mind brain identities could not be treated in the same way as ordinary theoretical identities. We "identify" pain by feeling it, and surely how it feels is an essential property of pain, not a contingent property. Thus, a mind body identity theory must provide a different explanation of why its identities are a posteriori. A new wave of materialists has appeared on the scene with a new strategy for explaining [1] the a posteriori nature of its alleged identities. The strategy is to locate the explanation for the a posteriori nature of mind body identities, not on the side of the world, but on the side of the mind -in different ways of thinking about or imagining, or in different concepts. Thus, on this new view, there is only one property—this brain process type, which is identical with this pain..



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,998

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Kripke and the mind-body problem.Dale Jacquette - 1987 - Dialectica 41 (4):293-300.
Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):261-273.
The mind-brain identity theory: a collection of papers.Clive Vernon Borst - 1970 - New York,: St Martin's P.. Edited by D. M. Armstrong.
Natural Kinds and the Identity of Property.Chang Seong Hong - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):89-98.
Physical Constituents of Qualia.István Aranyosi - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (2):103-131.
Against a posteriori moral naturalism.David Barnett - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):239 - 257.
Natural Kinds: (Thick) Essentialism or Promiscuous Realism?Nigel Leary - 2007 - Philosophical Writings 34 (1):5 - 13.


Added to PP

115 (#155,226)

6 months
7 (#431,609)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Terry Horgan
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

Revelation and physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.
A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.
Max Black's objection to mind-body identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.
Abduction and Modality.Stephen Biggs - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.
Revelation and the intuition of dualism.Michelle Liu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11491-11515.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references