Peter Carruthers vs. Donald Davidson on Propositional Attitudes

Abstract

I introduce and discuss debate on animal minds, emphasizing the perspectives of Peter Carruthers and Donald Davidson. I argue that crucial flaws in each account can be solved by appeal to a hierarchy of mindedness. I attempt to preserve an important conceptual link between belief and truth and I show how this can coexist with current scientific evidence.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,532

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

My notes

Similar books and articles

Davidson’s Theory of Propositional Attitudes.Richard Feldman - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.
Does Opacity Undermine Privileged Access?Timothy Allen & Joshua May - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):617-629.
Global broadcasting and self-interpretation.David Pereplyotchik - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):156-157.
A Role for Consciousness After All.Neil Levy - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):255-264.
A Davidsonian reconciliation of internalism, objectivity, and the belief-desire theory.Paul Hurley - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (1):1-20.
Rational animals.Donald Davidson - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):317-28.
Donald Davidson: truth, meaning, and knowledge.Urszula M. Żegleń (ed.) - 1999 - New York: Routledge.
Dual systems and dual attitudes.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):41-51.
Verdad y justificación en la filosofía de Donald Davidson.Carlos Caorsi - 2011 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 23 (2):263-276.
Transparency or Opacity of Mind?Martin F. Fricke - 2014 - Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 22:97-99.
Perception and intermediaries.Kathrin Glüer - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-03-26

Downloads
15 (#939,247)

6 months
1 (#1,472,167)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references