Does Opacity Undermine Privileged Access?

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):617-629 (2014)
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Abstract

Carruthers argues that knowledge of our own propositional attitudes is achieved by the same mechanism used to attain knowledge of other people's minds. This seems incompatible with "privileged access"---the idea that we have more reliable beliefs about our own mental states, regardless of the mechanism. At one point Carruthers seems to suggest he may be able to maintain privileged access, because we have additional sensory information in our own case. We raise a number of worries for this suggestion, concluding that Carruthers's new theory cannot clearly preserve the superior reliability of our beliefs about our own attitudes.

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Joshua May
University of Alabama, Birmingham

Citations of this work

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Self-Knowledge, Choice Blindness, and Confabulation.Hayley F. Webster - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst

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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
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The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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