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Ambiguously stung: Dworkin's semantic sting reconfigured
Legal Theory 8 (2):145-183 (2002)
Abstract
In Laws creation but disagree on whether those facts are sufficient to endow the rule with legal authority. This sort of disagreement is theoretical in nature as it concerns the grounds of law, which, according to positivism, are exhausted by the rule of recognitionAuthor's Profile
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Dworkin's Theoretical Disagreement Argument.Barbara Baum Levenbook - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):1-9.
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