According to the Standard Picture of how law works, the content of the law that is created by legal texts such as statutes and constitutional provisions is determined by the meaning of these texts. Most proponents of this picture claim more specifically that the relevant notion of meaning in play is the communicative content of legal texts and that communicative content is itself determined by considerations of the intentions of legal authorities. In recent years, the Standard Picture has become the (...) subject of heated philosophical debate. Focusing on statutes as the paradigmatic type of legal texts, this thesis aims to contribute to this debate in two central ways. First, it argues that the aforementioned ‘intention-based’ versions of the Standard Picture lack convincing responses to three important objections that have been raised by critics. First, they lack an adequate account of how legislative bodies can be reasonably ascribed the intentions that they would need according to such versions. Second, they fail to explain important aspects of legal practice. Third, they provide at best a parochial theory of the content of the law that is generated by statutes. The second contribution is to provide a more sustained defence of the Standard Picture by developing a new ‘commitment-based’ version of this view. This version is based on an alternative theory of communication and claims that communicative content is not determined by considerations of intentions but rather by the commitments that are incurred by means of communicative acts. It is argued that this version can deal with the objections that have been raised by critics and therefore provides a more robust version of the Standard Picture. (shrink)

Communication is crucial for us as human beings – much of what we know or believe, we learn through hearing or seeing what others say or express, and arguably part of what makes us human is our desire to communicate our thoughts and feelings to others. A core part of our communicative activity concerns linguistic communication, where we use the words and sentences of natural languages to communicate our ideas. But what exactly is going on in linguistic communication and what (...) is the relationship between what we say and what we think? This entry explores these issues. (shrink)

A frequently discussed question in recent jurisprudential debates concerns the extent to which conversational implicatures can be conveyed reliably in legal language. Roughly, an implicature is a piece of information that a speaker communicates indirectly, that is without making the conveyed information explicit. According to the classical analysis of implicatures, their successful communication depends on a shared expectation of interlocutors to be cooperative in conversation. However, recently some legal theorists have claimed that in legal language implicatures tend to be unreliable (...) because – according to them – communicative cooperation cannot be presumed in legal discourse to the same extent as in ordinary conversations. In this article, I will focus on implicatures in a particular kind of legal discourse, namely judicial opinions, and I will discuss to what extent we should also be sceptical about implicatures in this type of legal discourse. My aim is to suggest that scepticism about the reliability of implicatures in judicial opinions appears implausible once we take evidence into account, i.e. examples of implicatures from judicial opinions. I will argue that the evidence that sceptics provide is not only scarce but inconclusive and present a wealth of implicatures from judicial opinions that are not unreliable. I will conclude that an evidence-based approach casts the sceptical view into doubt and suggest that communicative cooperation is presumed in judicial opinions, as well. (shrink)