Faultless Moral Disagreement

Ratio 26 (4):410-427 (2013)
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Faultless disagreements are disagreements between two people, neither of whom has made a mistake or is at fault. It has been argued that there are faultless moral disagreements, that they cannot be accommodated by moral realism, and that in order to account for them, a form of relativism must be accepted. I argue that moral realism can accommodate faultless moral disagreement, provided that the phenomena is understood epistemically, and I give a brief defence of the relevant moral epistemology



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Alison Hills
Oxford University

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