Theoria 87 (3):837-846 (2021)

Authors
Giulio Pietroiusti
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract
Eriksson thinks that moral disagreements are intuitively faulty whereas disagreements about taste are intuitively faultless. He attempts to account for this difference by arguing, first, that moral judgements and taste judgements differ with regard to the presence of a disposition to challenge conflicting judgements and, second, that the intuition that a judgement is mistaken consists in the disposition to challenge it. In this article, I focus on the reasons given to support the first claim and argue that they are not sufficient. First, I assess the thesis that a taste judgement is only contingently connected with a disposition to challenge conflicting judgements. Second, I focus on the claim that a moral judgement is in part a disposition to challenge conflicting judgements. In both cases, I argue that the reasons given fail to disclose any substantial difference between the two domains.
Keywords disagreement  faultless disagreement  disagreement in attitude  moral judgement  judgement of taste  conflict
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12296
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References found in this work BETA

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Facts and Values.Charles L. Stevenson - 1963 - Yale University Press.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):110-114.
Disagreeing in Context.Teresa Marques - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:1-12.

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