Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):1-6 (2004)
AbstractSmythies and Ramachandran claim that the direct realist theory of perception has been refuted by recent psychophysics. This paper takes up the psychophysics, and the definition of direct realism employed by Smythies and Ramachandran, to show that direct realism has not been so refuted. I argue that the direct realist may grant that perceptual images are constructed by the central nervous system, without treating those images as “phenomenal objects.” Until phenomenal objects are shown to be distinct from extra-mental objects, and the only objects of perception properly so-called, the direct realist will remain generally edified by the relevant psychophysics
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