An empirical refutation of the direct realist theory of perception

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):437-438 (1997)
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Abstract

There are currently two main philosophical theories of perception - Direct Realism and the Representative Theory. The former is supported by most contemporary philosophers, whereas the latter forms the groundwork for most scientific theories in this area. The paper describes a recent experiment involving retinal and cortical rivalry that provides strong empirical evidence that the Direct Realist theory is incorrect. There are of course a large number of related experiments on visual perception that would tend to lead us to the same conclusion, but the experiment described in this paper does so in a singularly direct and straightforward manner. Often the most telling experiments are the simplest

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References found in this work

Mind in Science.Richard Gregory - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):525-529.

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