Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):437-438 (1997)
AbstractThere are currently two main philosophical theories of perception - Direct Realism and the Representative Theory. The former is supported by most contemporary philosophers, whereas the latter forms the groundwork for most scientific theories in this area. The paper describes a recent experiment involving retinal and cortical rivalry that provides strong empirical evidence that the Direct Realist theory is incorrect. There are of course a large number of related experiments on visual perception that would tend to lead us to the same conclusion, but the experiment described in this paper does so in a singularly direct and straightforward manner. Often the most telling experiments are the simplest
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References found in this work
Mind In Science: A History Of Explanations In Psychology And Physics.Richard Langton Gregory - 1981 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mind in Science.Richard Gregory - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):525-529.
When the Brain Changes its Mind: Interocular Grouping During Binocular Rivalry.Ilona Kovacs, Thomas Papathomas, Ming Yang & Akos Feher - 1997 - Investigative Ophthalmology and Visual Science 38 (4):2249-2249.
Perception: A Causal Representative Theory.E. J. Lowe - 1993 - In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.